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CURRENT LEGISLATION
accord with the state statutes, and by eliminating the juvenile's right
of waiver. In construing a revision in such tenor, it is probable that
a clear-sighted judiciary would give due weight to the statement that
"It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlightened
government, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and provide
for the comfort and well being of such of its citizens as, by reasons
of infancy * * * are unable to take care of themselves. The per-
formance of this duty is justly regarded as one of the most important
of government functions, and all constitutional limitations must be so
understood and construed as not to interfere with its proper and
legitimate exercise." 62
BENJAMIN M. BIENSTOCK.
THIE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND INTERPLEADER.-On June
8, 1939, Section 51a of the Civil Practice Act' went into effect. This
is a statute introducing a novel way of handling the problem of the
hazard of double liability to which debtors are subjected. The method
employed is a short statute of limitations. The passage of the statute
was made necessary by the practical defects of the existing state 2
and federal 3 interpleader acts insofar as service upon adverse claim-
ants is concerned. This need was further intensified by the recent
political developments in Europe and the Far East.4 In order to
guard against threatened liquidation and confiscation of their monies
and assets, prospective refugees in the former republics of Austria
and Czechoslovakia had deposited monies with New York residents,
banks or insurance companies. When these refugees sought to sat-
isfy their claims in New York, the bank or other depositories were
also met with claims made by a foreign government, or its represen-
tative, the liquidator, who alleged an assignment in fact or an assign-
ment by operation of law.5 In order to determine the controversy
completely so as to avoid the risk of double liability, multiplicity of
suits, the possibility of inconsistent jury verdicts, and to save costs
and expenses, the interpleader procedure suggests itself.6
The unavailability of the New York interpleader statute 7 in
6 2 McLean County v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378 (1882).
'N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 805; the bill was introduced by Assemblyman Mitchell.2 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 285, 287.
n49 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(26) (Supp. 1939).
4 But the Act is by no means intended to be an emergency one, but is to be
a permanent enactment. See Bulletin iof Legislative Reporter, N. Y. L. J.,
April 18, 1939.
5 See Stern v. Steiner, N. Y. L. J., April 20, 1939, p. 1810, col. 4.
6 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Segaritis, 20 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Pa. 1937).
See 11 CARMODY, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1935) at 608, § 727.
7 See note 2, supra.
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such a situation is evident. To entertain the action, the court must
obtain jurisdiction either of the person, or of the res, i.e., the subject
matter of the action. If the non-resident appears or voluntarily sub-
mits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, or if the process is served
upon him personally' in New York, there is no problem. The diffi-
culty arises where personal jurisdi~tion is lacking, and whether in
such case, service by publication, pursuant lo Section 232 of the Civil
Practice Act, can be availed of. One could proceed under subdivi-
sion 6, if the complaint demanded that the defendant, the adverse
claimant, be excluded from a vested or contingent interest in or upon
a lien on property situated in this state, i.e., if the res or the debt had
its situs in New York.8 But the courts have consistently held that
the debt in interpleader cases does not have its situs where the .debtor
resides; 9 nor does the depositing into court of the amount claimed,
give jurisdiction, for according to the leading Supreme Court case of
N. Y. Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy,10 the claim of the non-
resident is not directed against a particular deposit,'" but runs against
the stakeholder upon the original debt; it is an in personam action,
and cannot be transformed into an in rem action by deposit into
court.' 2 Hence, the adverse claimant, who is sought to be substi-
tuted as the real defendant, must be served personally to avail him-
self of Section 287 of the Civil Practice Act.
The Federal Interpleader Act 's was an attempt to solve thejurisdictional problems arising from the weakness of the state stat-
utes. It made possible for the federal courts, unrestricted by state
boundaries, to obtain jurisdiction of citizens of different states with-
8 Garfein v. Mclnnis, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73 (1928).
9 Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921) (holding that
the action of interpleader, under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 285, is an action inpersonar and that the Maryland court did not have to give full faith and credit
to the New York judgment against a non-resident who was not served person-
ally and who failed to appear) ; Bullowa v. Provident Life and Trust Co., 125App. Div. 545, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (1st Dept. 1908) (holding that the motion
of interpleader under N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT § 287 must be served personally);
Schoenholz v. N. Y. Insurance Co., 197 App. Div. 91, 188 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st
Dept. 1921), aff'd, 234 N. Y. 24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922).10241 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613 (1916).
11 Cf. Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438(1907) (where jurisdiction by service by publication was good as the proceed-
ing was against a particular fund) ; Ebsary Gypsum Co. v. Ruby, 256 N. Y.
406, 176 N. E. 820 (1931) (service by publication was ineffectual because the
situs of the debt was the domicile of the owners of the patent, outside of New
York).
12 See Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326,335, 130 N. E. 566, 571 (1921),
citing with approval New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518,36 Sup. Ct. 613 (1916); PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEw YoRRK
PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 857, n.7.
13 See note 3, supra. The first Federal Interpleader Act was passed in
1917, 39 STAT. 929, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(26), permitting insurance companies tointerplead. Subsequent amendments extended the lists to other stakeholders.
The present 1936 amendment (note 3, mipra) extends the list to "any person,
firm, corporation, association or sociey."
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out the need of serving process within the narrow confines of a
sovereign state.14 But even the federal courts have no jurisdiction
in the following cases:
(1) if the adverse claimants are not citizens of different
states; 15
(2) if process of the federal courts is to be effected outside
the territorial limits of the United States; 16 and
(3) if the amount deposited by the stakeholder in the inter-
pleader action is less than $500.1'7
Thus, a stakeholder cannot serve the adverse claimant, a resident
of former Czechoslovakia, since he is a citizen of a different country
(not a different state), and because the process of the federal courts
cannot be effected in that country. There is also the difficulty in-
volved in determining when a diversity of citizenship exists, so as
to bring the case within the purview of the United States Constitu-
tion. It has been held that if one of the claimants is a citizen of one
state, and all other claimants and stakeholder are citizens of others,
there is a diversity of citizenship.' 8 But it has not yet been finally
determined by the Supreme Court whether diversity of citizenship
exists when all claimants are citizens of the same state, and only the
stakeholder is a citizen of a different state.'9
I.
Cognizant of the weaknesses of these statutes, the Legislature
adopted and passed, at the recommendation of the Committee on Law
Reform of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,20
Section 51a of the Civil Practice Act.21 In order to avoid the juris-
dictional difficulties and limitations of the state and federal statutes,
a stakeholder should proceed under this Act. The provisions 22 of
1449 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(26)e (Supp. 1938).
1 Id. §41(26)a.
161d. §41(26)e.
17 Id. §41(26) a.
18 Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937).
19 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp. 967 (D. C. Ky.
1936) (holding there is jurisdiction). See Chafee, Interpleader in tte United
States Court (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1166. But see early cases denying existence
of diversity of citizenship. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 134 Mass. 389 (1833).
20 See THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMI'rEE ON LAW REFORM OF THE
AssocIATioN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FOR 1938-1939, at 234
235.
21 See note 1, supra.
22 Section 1 of the Act provides: "No action for the recovery of any sum
of money due and payable under or on account of a contract, or for any part
thereof, shall be commenced by any person who has made claim to said sum
1939 ]
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the Act will be discussed under three divisions: prerequisites to
proceeding thereunder, procedure, and effect of compliance.
Prerequisites.
In order for the stakeholder to avail himself of the statute, it
seems that the following conditions must exist:
(a) an action against the stakeholder must be pending; 23
(b) the action must be for monwy over $50 in amount, due
and payable under, or on account of, a contract; 24
(c) the adverse claimant or claimants cannot, with due dili-
gence, be personally served with process within this
state; 25
(d) the general requirements for entertaining any interpleader
action must be present: the conflicting claims must be for
the same thing or the same debt, the stakeholder must
claim no interest in the subject matter and must not be
in collusion with the plaintiff, but must be in doubt as to
the rightful owner; 26 and
(e) the stakeholder must comply with a prescribed procedure
and serve the adverse claimant with a notice of the pen-
dency of the action, stating his rights will be barred unless
he commences an action to enforce his claim, or applies
to intervene in the pending action, within one year from
the date of service of the notice.2 7
Procedure.
Assume that claimant-1 prosecutes an action for $450 against
S, stakeholder. Claimant-2 has also made a claim on S to the same
after the expiration of one year from the giving of notice, as hereinafter
provided, to the said claimant that an action commenced by another person is
pending to recover said sum or any part thereof exceeding fifty dollars in
amount."
23 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 51a, subas. 1, 2, 3.
24 Ibid. Cf. CIv. PRAC. Acr §§ 287a-287c, N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 804, which
were introduced as companion bills to the statute under consideration and went
into effect on the same date. These sections, constituting Article 28a of the
Crv. PRAc. AcT pertain to actions in which the stakeholder is interested in deter-
mining adverse claims to specific personal property, whereas under the statute
under consideration, the stakeholder is interested in determining claims to
money; FEDERAL INTERPLEADER Acr, note 17, supra, where the minimum amount
is $500; N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 287, in which the action may be based on
ejectment and replevin as well as contract.
25 Id. § 51a, subd. 2.
26 4 POmEROY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1919) § 1328.
27 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 51a, subds. 2, 3.
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money. Clainant-2 is a non-resident of New York, who refuses to
appear in the action and upon whom personal service (and therefore
substituted service) 28 cannot be had.29 S may, within twenty days
from the date of service upon him of the complaint (or within twenty
days from the date of receipt by him of the claim) of claimant-i,
apply to the court where the action is pending for an order permit-
ting him to give notice to claimant-2 of the pendency of the action
and to inform him that his rights will be barred unless he commences
an action to enforce his claim, or intervenes in the pending action
within one year and ten days from the date of said order.30 The form
of the notice is prescribed by the statute and must be substantially
complied with.3 ' It must be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of claimant-2, and must be accompanied with a copy of the
summons and complaint with which claimant-i served S.32 S must
then file proof of the mailing of such notice within ten days from
the date of the order,33 otherwise the order becomes inoperative.3 4
The court will thereafter make an order staying further prosecution
of the action by claimant-1 for a period not to exceed one year from
the date of the giving of notice to claimant-2.3 5  At the same time,
or at any time thereafter (for the protection of claimant-1), the court
may order S to give an undertaking, or, in lieu thereof, pay the cash
into court.30
Effect.
If the adverse non-resident claimant complies with the notice by
intervening in the pending action within the prescribed one year from
the date of service of the notice, the court has jurisdiction over his
person,3 7 and can render an in personam judgment,3 8 and thus the
controversy will be finally decided in one action. If the adverse non-
resident claimant complies with the notice by commencing an action
to enforce his claim in this state within the prescribed time, the same
28id. § 230; PRASHKER, op. cit. mspra note 12, at 242.
29 Although diversity of citizenship exists, and S has deposited the amount
into court, the Federal Interpleader Act is unavailable to S because the amount
involved is less than $500. See note 17, mtpra.30 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 51a, subd. 2. But "The limitation herein pre-
scribed shall not be construed to enlarge the time within which the cause of
action, if any, of the said claimant would otherwise be barred." Id. § 51a,
subd. 1.
31 Id. § 51a, subd. 2.
32 Cf. N. Y. VEHIcI= AND TRAFFc LAw § 52, where a similar procedure is
used.
33 N. Y. Civ. PRuc. AcT § 51a, subd. 2.
34 Ibid.
35Id. § 51a, subd. 3.
36 Ibid.
3 Id. § 237. Voluntary submission is effected by a general appearance.
Reed v. Chilson, 142 N. Y. 152, 36 N. E. 884 (1894).38 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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result will follow, for the two actions may then be consolidated into
one, on motion by either party. 9 The suit culminating in the judg-
ment, being one for money by a court which had personal jurisdic-
tion 40 over a defendant, must be given full faith and credit by a
sister state under the Federal Constitution.41 A subsequent suit by
the adverse non-resident claimant in his own or other state will, there-
fore, be barred, as the New York judgment is res adjudicata and
estops the adverse non-resident claimant.42 If the adverse non-resident
claimant refuses or fails to intervene in the pending action or to com-
mence an action within the one year, the action originally commenced
against the stakeholder will be prosecuted to a conclusion, and the
non-resident claimant will be barred from litigating his claim.
43
II.
The constitutionality of the Act may be attacked on four grounds:
that it deprives the non-resident claimant of property without due
process of law; 4 4 that it violates the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution; 4 that it impairs the obligation of contract
clause; 46 and that it violates the power of the Federal Government
to make treaties.
47
Under the due process clause. It may be claimed that the Act
arbitrarily reduces the period from the present six-year limitation in
contract cases 48 to a one-year limitation. But the power of the
Legislature to accelerate the time within which a right, even a vested
right, is barred, is well recognized.4 9  The only restriction is that
it accord a reasonable time within which it may be enforced.50 It
is submitted that one year is a reasonable time 51 for it will not work
a hardship, since every precaution for giving notice of pendency of
the action is provided for.
52
39 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 96. Because of compliance the stay may be
vacated and the undertaking discharged. Id. § Sla, subd. 3. If the non-resident
starts the suit in the federal court consolidation may be had in certain cases.
See FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20, 22, 24.
40 See note 37, supra.
41 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, 21 Sup. Ct.
555 (1901) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682 (1910).
42 Emery v. Hovey, 84 N. H. 499, 153 At. 322 (1931); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. International Trust Co., 144 Misc. 127, 258 N. Y. Supp. 465 (1932).
43 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 51a, subd. 1.
44 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
45 Id. § 2 ("The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.").
46 Id. Art. I, § 10.
47 Id. Art. IV, § 2.
48N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AT §48(1).
49 WooD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONs (4th ed. 1916) § 12b.
50 Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 118, 124, 53 N. E. 753, 754 (1899).
51 For existing statutes wherein the period of limitation is one year see
N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 51; N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW § 326.
52 Cf. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 52, where similar notice is pro-
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Under the equal protection clause. It may be objected that the
Act makes an unjust distinction between a non-resident claimant,
who is limited by a one-year period of limitation, and a resident, to
whom the one-year period is inapplicable. But this classification
seems reasonable,53 especially since the state has an interest in pro-
tecting its resident debtors against the hazard of double liability.
Furthermore, a state may impose reasonable conditions for access to
its courts.
5 4
Under the impairing of obligation of contract clause. It may be
objected that by permitting a one-year stay of the action, there is a
violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution. But
existing obligations of contract must be distinguished from existing
remedies for enforcement of contracts.55 While the former may not
be impaired, the latter may be changed or modified, provided sub-
stantial rights are not affected.56 A stay for a definite and reason-
able time (one year in this instance) should be valid.5 7
Under the power to make treaties clause. It may be objected
that the Act conflicts with the Federal Government's power to make
treaties because it governs actiofis of foreign claimants. But the Act
applies to all non-residents and, in absence of conflict with the terms
of a treaty, the statute will unquestionably control.58
The constitutionality of the statute may be based on a firmer
ground-the power of the state to pass statutes of limitations.59 This
right of the Legislature has long been recognized and is founded on
sound public policy, based on the general experience of mankind.60
Such a statute is one of repose, intended to bar stale and vexatious
claims, to effect a prompt administration of justice, and to prevent
surprise against parties who after a period of time may have lost their
evidence or cannot locate their witnesses.6 ' A conclusive presump-
tion against its original validity is indulged in, due to the failure and
neglect of the owner of a right to pursue his remedy in time. If
payment is sought, the presumption is that it has been paid.6 2 Such
a statute, therefore, affects no substantive right, but is one of pro-
cedure and remedy.63 Nor is it an unconscionable or dishonorable
vided for. Such form of notice is reasonable and satisfies the due process law.
Schushereba v. Ames, 255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931).
53 Canadian Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 40 Sup. Ct. 402 (1920).
54 Atchinson v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct. 609 (1899).
55 Waltermire v. Westover, 14 N. Y. 16, 21 (1856).
51 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 553 (U. S. 1867).
57 Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313, 319 (1863).
58 Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30, 52 Sup. Ct. 81 (1931).
59 Hamilton v. The Royal Ins. Co., 156 N. Y. 327, 50 N. E. 863 (1898).0 Ibid.
61 United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100
(1922).
62 Conkling v. Weatherwax, 181 N. Y. 258, 73 N. E. 1028 (1905).
63 STORY, CONFmCT OF LAW (8th ed. 1883) 793; WooD, op. ct. supra note
49, § 8. In Europe it is considered part of the substantive law. Note (1919)
28 YALE L. J. 492.
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defense,6 but a meritorious one.6 5
But the New York statute has no extra-territorial effect.66 If
the adverse claimant pursues his remedy in another state where he
can obtain jurisdiction over the stakeholder, how shall this stake-
holder meet the claim? He cannot successfully defend on the ground
of a prior judgment in favor of another claimant."7 He must rely
on the defense that the present claim is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. 8 The recognition of this defense will, in turn, depend
upon the conflict of laws doctrine of the forum. 69 If the forum's
law is similar to our ,own, as expressed in Section 13 of the Civil
Practice Act, the action cannot be maintained' if the cause of action
is barred in the state or country where it arose, except where the
cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of the forum.70
It will therefore be incumbent upon the stakeholder to show that
the cause of action arose in New York. In contract cases, the cause
of action is said to arise in the place where breach of performance
takes place-where payment is to be made but refused.71  But even
if the cause of action arose in New York, the stakeholder cannot
succeed if the claimant sues in the state where he was a resident at
the time the cause of action accrued. 72 Thus, suppose claimant-i
sued S insurance company in New York (where the money is pay-
able on January 1, 1939), and S proceeded under Section 51a of the
Civil Practice Act, notifying claimant-2, a resident of Ohio. Claimant-
2 failed to comply with the notice properly served by S. The defense
of the Statute of Limitations in New York will be good provided
claimant-2 was not a resident of Ohio on January 1, 1939. But this
is only true if Ohio's conflict of laws doctrine is similar to our own.73
Another problem must be considered-whether the stakeholder's
64 Hart v. Goadby, 72 Misc. 232, 129 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1911).
65 Abbott v. Johnson, 130 Ark. 1, 195 S. W. 676 (1917).
66 Cooper v. Jewett, 233 Fed. 618 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; Goodrich v. Roch-
ester Trust Co., 173 App. Div. 577, 582, 160 N. Y. Supp. 454, 458 (4th Dept.
1916).
67 See note 9, supra.
68 See note 65, supra.
69 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 604.
70 A majority of the states have enacted legislation by which they apply the
statutes of limitation of other states' to suits in the forum. CHEATHAM,
DOWLING AND GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1st ed. 1936) 371. See Note
(1935) 35 CoL L. REv. 762, 764, n.11 (listing thirty-three states that have
adopted such "borrowing" statutes). These statutes are held to be additional
limitations. Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920). For the constitu-
tionality of such statutes see Klotz v. Angle, 220 N. Y. 347, 116 N. E. 24
(1917).
71 Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U. S. 253, 47 Sup. Ct. 625 (1927);
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897
(1934).
72 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 13.
73 The basis for applying the foreign statute of limitations is not as a
substitute for that of the forum, but really because we adopted it as our own.
Isenberg v. Rainier, 145 App. Div. 256, 130 N. Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dept. 1911).
See (1934) 4 BKLYN. L. Rxv. 76.
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defense of the Statute of Limitations will be a bar to a subsequent
suit by a foreign government or liquidator. A statute of limitations
cannot run against a domestic sovereign, 74 unless it has consented to
be bound by it.7 1 This is for the reason that otherwise the sovereign's
dignity is encroached upon, and that public policy requires that the
state and its taxpayers should not be penalized for the negligence
and laches of its officers. 76 The rule does not apply when the federal
or state government sues in a private capacity.7 7 Dictum in a case
has extended the rule for the benefit of foreign sovereignties. 78  In
another case 7 9 doubt was expressed as to the soundness of such ex-
tension. Recently, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States 80 seems to
have settled the issue and upheld the sounder view that the Statute
of Limitation of the forum runs against a foreign government as
much as it runs against private litigants.81 The Statute of Limitation
is part of the rules of the forum, and the foreign government having
chosen to litigate in the forum, must comply with its procedure.82
Hence, it appears that the Statute will be effective to bar the claim
of a liquidator-whether he be considered by the courts as a foreign
sovereign or not.88
III.
The Statute is another step in the direction of meeting the in-
tolerable burden of rendering debtors twice liable on the same debt;
but it is by no means all-inclusive. It is restricted to actions based
on contract. It has no application to conflicting claims to specific
personal property. But in that case the stakeholder may proceed
under Sections 287a-287e of the Civil Practice Act, a companion
statute of the one under consideration. 4 The Act's primary weak-
ness is that its effect depends upon the conflict of laws doctrine of
the forum wherein the second suit is brought by the adverse non-
resident claimant.85 But when the suit is brought in New York, its
importance to the stakeholder is far-reaching and will avoid such
anomalous results as experienced in the Hanna and Bullowa cases.8 6
When a foreign liquidator is the claimant, it seems to be the sole re-
74 United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason 311 (U. S. 1821).
75 By the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 54 this state is bound by the Statute of
Limitations except in actions for recovery of real property.
76 WATKINS, THE STATUS OF A PARTY LITIGANT (1927) 197, 198.
77 United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338, 347 (1888).
78 Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U. S. 627, 631, 34 Sup. Ct. 461 (1914).
79 French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U. S. 427, 24 Sup.
Ct. 145 (1903).
80 304 U. S. 126, 58 Sup. Ct. 785 (1938).
s8 Id. at 136, Sup. Ct. at 790.
82Ibid.; Le Roy v. Crawningshield, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8269 (1820).
83 See note 4, supra.
84 See note 24, supra.
85 See note 70, supra.
86 See note 9, supra.
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lief to the stakeholder. The basis for its constitutionality also seems
sound.8 7 None the less, it is more advisable to proceed wherever
possible under Section 287 of the Civil Practice Act, or the Federal
Interpleader Act 8 not only because they have survived constitu-
tional tests, but because the relief thereunder is quicker; under the new
statute as much as one year might pass before a case is disposed of.89
At any rate, if the legislation proves as successful as it is hoped, the
Statute of Limitations will become an important weapon in the hands
of the Legislature with which it can overcome jurisdictional obstacles
in the courts. From the economic point of view, the statute should
be an important factor in relieving American businessmen of fear
and danger in doing business with foreign citizens.
SAMUEL M. SINGER.
THE UNCLAIMED LIFE INSURANCE FUNDS Acr.--The economic
plague has, for the last ten years, devastated the financial fields, con-
sumed all the fruits of prosperity investments, exhausted all accumu-
lated reserves and rendered unbearable the burden of the taxpayer.
It has constrained the legislatures to enact more and more revenue
legislation. The New York Legislature, in its quest for new modes
of taxation, has discovered a new source for revenue, the unclaimed
funds in the domestic life insurance corporations.
On June 17, 1939, Governor Lehman had the choice of signing
one of two bills I on the same subject. He signed the McNaboe bill,
which immediately became the law.2 The draftsmen, in planning the
bill, intended, to use the proverbial saying, to kill two birds with one
stone. Not only was the bill designed to alleviate the troublesome
details confronting the life insurance corporations in their safeguard-
ing the funds of forgetful policyholders,3 but also to add new income
to the coffers of the state treasury, and this, perhaps, was the pri-
mary purpose of the legislation. 4
87 See note 59, supra.
88 See note 3, supra.
89 See note 22, supra.
2The McNaboe bill (Senate No. 2896) and the Hampton bill (Senate
No. 2962), both imposing similar requirements on domestic life insurance cor-
porations, were presented to the Governor for signature. The Governor vetoed,
without memorandom, the Hampton bill.
2 N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 923, §§ 295-299; N. Y. INs. LAW §§ 295-299; N. Y.
STATE FINAN CE LAW § 44-h.
3 According to Mr. Morris H. Siegel, the insurance counselor and director
of the Policyholders Advisory Council who helped prepare the bill, the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Corporation alone in its industrial department is holding
$250,000,000 in reserves on lapsed policies.
4 Mr. Siegel estimates that with the McNaboe bill the State of New York
should receive approximately $25,000,000 in the first year of the law's operation,
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